Freedom of Choice: A Pragmatic Argument for the Permissibility of Assisted Suicide by Accavitti, Michael Joseph
FREEDOM OF CHOICE: A PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT FOR THE PERMISSIBILITY OF 
ASSISTED SUICIDE
BY
Michael Joseph Accavitti Jr. 
Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
Philosophy 
August, 2011
Nashville, Tennessee
Approved:
Professor John Lachs
Professor Michael Hodges 
Professor Mark Bliton
ii
To my Father and Mother
ii
1 
 The focus of this thesis will be an arguement for the 
permissibility of assisted suicide as an end-of-life treatment. 
In parts I and II, I will argue that assisted suicide has 
similar physical and experiential effects compared to other 
currently allowed end-of-life treatments. In part III, I will 
argue that the difference in meaning that can be gained by a 
patient who elects to take their own life can be very fulfilling 
and that society currently does certain patients an injustice by 
forbidding them from taking their own lives. This paper will not 
argue that assisted suicide will or should be a preferred end of 
life treatment for any patient; rather it will support the 
ability to choose assisted suicide for those patients who may 
gleam extra meaning from the act. The paper will extend its 
pragmatic analysis of the differences between currently allowed 
acts and assisted suicide to include a discussion of how, in 
light of work by William James, this added meaning is 
pragmatically good.   
 
Part I 
 In recent years, there has been an explosion in the world 
of applied ethics. This drive has been furthered by the mixing 
of cultures due to increased globalization and the difficulty of 
addressing morally right behavior. The presence of what appears 
to be pluralism has been challenged by thinkers who desire to 
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maintain the status quo of western religious-derived moralities. 
Increasingly, however, these systems fail to appeal to our sense 
of how best to care for people and respect their personal 
desires.   
  At the same time, theorists are taking careful steps to 
ensure that the new applied ethics do not offend the spiritual 
sensibilities of the religious population; rather theorists 
recognize the freedom of the religious to maintain obligations 
similar to the non-theistic. The result has been the rapid 
expansion of applied ethics in many fields and a scramble for 
power between differing schools. One school, pragmatism, 
maintains an advantage over others because it is already built 
around the way people actually behave. A product of thinkers in 
psychology, education, and political science - all with a new 
found focus on empiricism - pragmatism is uniquely suited for 
the challenges of modern applications.  
 In no field may this applicability be more apparent than in 
the burgeoning field of medical ethics. Here, theistic medical 
practitioners deal with atheistic patients and hedonistic 
administrators. The confrontation of perspectives is challenging 
because of medicine’s tendency to defer to expertise. For a long 
time, the existing and lopsided power structure between patient 
and physician alienated patients. As questions began to be asked 
about how to compensate for this unevenness, solutions flowed in 
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from a wide range of sources. Doctors with an eye toward reform 
spoke with clergy who were concerned about the way in which 
people were losing control of their own lives. The mission was 
not only to balance out the doctor-patient relationship, but 
also to push further and create a set of common rules and 
criteria to strengthen the patient’s role in his own care. Also 
into this space came the philosophers, bringing with them their 
rigid and detailed ethical structures, ready to test them in the 
clinic. The result, so far, has been a somewhat fragmented map 
of ethical education that ranges from the utterly practical, in 
the case of nurses and medical students, to the overly abstract, 
in the case of traditional philosophers.  
 The meeting point between these differing approaches 
involves the recognition of the dissimilar demands placed on the 
actors in a medical environment. The resulting mixture is 
practical, a realization of how things have already come 
together, much like in pragmatism.  That this blending has 
occurred on its own is no surprise. It is similarly not 
surprising that ethicists are increasingly turning to pragmatism 
as an ethical system for precisely this reason. Pragmatism 
offers an applicable system for interrogating difficult 
questions in medical ethics, such as assisted suicide. The focus 
of this paper will be on demonstrating the usefulness of 
pragmatism in recognizing and addressing the issues that 
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currently occupy the assisted-suicide debate. It will also use a 
Jamesian approach to argue for the permissibility of assisted 
suicide in limited cases.  
 William James’s work, as a focus point of this paper, is 
inspired by the simplicity of this initial formulation of his 
pragmatic principles: “Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought 
to be able to show some practical difference that must follow 
from one side or the other’s being right.”1 Assisted suicide and 
the debate surrounding it are most definitely serious, but as I 
will argue, there seems to be a grave misconception as to what 
the differences are between it and currently allowed practices. 
The differences in how the treatments physically affect patients 
are small, but the emotional and moral impacts these choices may 
have on patients are great. Still, as James tells us, for our 
investigation to prove fruitful, we must make sure to pay 
attention to all the details and to all the differences. The 
essential question of pragmatism is, “what difference would it 
practically make to any one if this notion rather than that 
notion were true?”2 In this respect, I will argue that much is at 
stake in defining the difference between assisted suicide and 
currently available end-of-life treatments. Furthermore, I 
believe that the differences between assisted suicide and 
                                                
1 William James. Pragmatism. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), 26.  
2 Ibid., 28.  
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euthanasia have been minimized, severely damaging the idea of 
assisted suicide as a choice for rational, moral adults.  
 Pragmatism as a school of thought is particular in not only 
its Americanness but also in the common sense nature that 
defines its functionality. Unlike other consequentialist 
philosophies, pragmatism is not based on an external idea of 
what is ‘good’. Instead, its focus is on what works in the 
instrumental sense. In ethical discussions, this idea translates 
into the idea of maximizing the fulfillment of desires. That is 
to say, James believes that creating maxims that attempt to 
define what is good is a misdirected project. We should not 
attempt to determine a priori what is good, he argues, but 
rather base our determinations by measuring “how much more 
outcry or how much more appeasement comes about,” as a result of 
different choices.3 What is good or bad, according to James, is 
not a truth older than time itself, but rather, the terms are 
defined by their empirically measured effects. In its simplest 
form, morality is a reflection of the feelings of an individual, 
“so far as he feels anything to be good, he makes it good.”4 In a 
complex universe with a multitude of people, however, morality 
becomes a balance of desires, ease of execution, and the reality 
of the difference. James states that “if one ideal judgment be 
                                                
3 William James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life.” From Ethics, Ed. Steven M. Cahn. (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2006) 361.  
 
4 Ibid., 363.  
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objectively better than another, that better-ness must be made 
flesh by being lodged concretely in someone’s actual 
perception.”5 Simply enough, “the essence of good is simply to 
satisfy demand,” where demands are a desire for outcomes or 
states.6 Thanks to this formulation, pragmatism is able to 
account for the differences between the beliefs of individuals 
on the edges of our understanding. There is, according to 
pragmatism, “no common character” that connects the moral ideas 
of individuals, “apart from the fact that they are ideals.”7 
Because of this, the context of situations and the desires of 
the individuals involved become the ultimate determinations of 
morality. 
  James’s most famous example of the importance of 
difference for pragmatism comes from his essay “What Pragmatism 
Means.” In the essay, he tells the story of a camping trip he 
took with friends during which a debate arose over whether a man 
passed around a squirrel that was on a tree. While the man would 
walk in a circle around the tree, the squirrel would constantly 
move so that its stomach was facing the man, hiding its body 
from the view of the man. James’s response to his friends’ 
questions was to ask them to clarify what it is they meant by 
going around the squirrel: “‘Which party is right,’ [James] 
said, ‘depends on what you practically mean by ‘going round’ the 
                                                
5 Ibid., 365.  
6 Ibid., 365.  
7 Ibid., 362.  
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squirrel.’”8 If the men meant make a circle around the tree and 
therefore also the squirrel, then the man did go around the 
squirrel. On the contrary, if they meant that the man must see 
all sides of the squirrel, including its back, then the man did 
not go around the squirrel. James claims that all one must do 
is, “make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any 
farther dispute.”9  
 The discussion that follows will use this practical 
difference as a measuring stick to gauge what it is exactly that 
separates assisted suicide from other currently allowable 
practices such as Continual Deep Sedation, an accepted and legal 
palliative therapy. I will argue that the practical difference 
between assisted suicide and CDS occurs only in name, as both 
treatments end the lives of the patients who undergo them. 
Furthermore, I will argue that there is a difference in meaning 
that can be derived from these acts and that in disallowing one 
but allowing the other, we do a great disservice to those people 
who would, if they were allowed, choose assisted suicide.  
 Before we can begin to address how pragmatism helps us work 
through the problems of assisted suicide, we must first examine 
all the different points around the debate. The largest issue 
will be working through the terminology and technicalities of 
differing patient states. I will do this with the aid of Mary 
                                                
8 Pragmatism, 25. 
9 Ibid., 25. 
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Moalgland and Micah Hester, as well as with appeals to 
scientific literature.  
 Discussions of end-of-life care are filled with loaded and 
often confused terms: euthanasia, passive or active; assisted 
suicide, physician or other; palliative or hospice care. The 
difficulty in this discussion is that because so much has 
already been attached to these terms,  delineating them may 
prove to be an insurmountable obstacle.  Nevertheless, by 
appealing to strong arguments made by others, I hope to convince 
the reader of an effective way to view the differences among 
terms. Mary Mahowald eschews the conventional terminology for a 
more direct approach in her “On Helping People to Die: a 
Pragmatic Account”:  
First, then, what does it mean to kill someone? 
Among the possible meanings of killing, consider the 
following:  
1. Killing means ending the life of someone 
2. Killing means letting someone die when one could 
have prevented it 
3. Killing means helping someone to die 10 
 
Using these formulations, we can tie our legacy terminology to 
these more direct definitions. Definition #1 would be what we 
would call euthanasia or active euthanasia, definition #2 would 
be passive euthanasia, and #3 would be assisted suicide. Now, of 
course this is not to say that all cases of definition #1 (that 
all killing of another) would be euthanasia, but rather that 
                                                
10 Mary B. Mahowald. “On Helping People Die.” From Pragmatic Bioethics, ed. Glenn McGee. 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003),109. 
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euthanasia, as discussed in medical ethics literature, would 
undoubtedly be thought of as akin to definition #1. Certainly, 
first-degree murder would also fall under definition #1, as 
would second-degree murder or the killing of an opposing solider 
in war time. However, in the medical realm, definition #1 will 
most often manifest itself as euthanasia.  
  Mahowald believes that there are still issues with these 
definitions in their simple states, and while I agree better 
work can be done, I disagree with where that revision would take 
place. Mahowald is worried that none of these definitions tell 
us if the person wanted to die or not or how the person dies. In 
regard to the latter concern, for our purposes we must imagine 
that the patients in #s 2 and 3 would suffer a death not caused 
by us as an actor. That is, for definition #1, one person kills 
another directly; and in definition #3, a person is the ultimate 
cause of his own death.  But in case #2, a person may be dying 
from a self afflicted injury, an injury done to him by another, 
or any number of other deathly injuries. Not helping a stabbing 
victim, a patient having a stroke, or a person found overdosed 
on medication would all count as facets of definition #2. 
Furthermore, we must maintain this plentitude when examining 
these cases, as it would be unfair to assume that all instances 
of letting someone die occur to elderly patients in hospice 
care.  
10 
  As to Mahowald’s former complaint about the vagueness of a 
person’s will to die , I think that it is clear in definition #3 
that the person would have to want to die in order for any 
contribution to be considered ‘helping’. The reason I draw out 
this point is because I want to make it clear that statement #3 
is not saying we help someone by killing them, for this would be 
a completely different point that would rely on an idea of a 
higher good that we were achieving by killing them. While #3 may 
prove to be beneficial, it is not a claim that we help a person 
in a moral way, but rather just in a mechanical way. That is to 
say, we provide some part of the essential means required for 
the person to kill themselves. If there is some sort of moral 
benefit to be derived from this act, it is completely dependent 
on the desires of the patient.  
 These definitions established, we can turn to the analysis 
of current care protocols, such as do not resuscitate orders or 
Continual Deep Sedation. Acts like DNR orders seem to fall under 
definition #2, as the patient asks us to allow him to die when 
he has reached a certain naturally irreversible state. In this 
way, not resuscitating a patient could also be construed as 
falling in line with #3, depending on if this order was well 
established as the wish of the patient. The difference between 
numbers 2 and 3 is simply that intention of the patient. In 
assisted suicide, we see a similar mirroring of effects. 
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Assisting in suicide is separated from #1 not only by the 
intention of the patient (the helping) but also by the actor 
that is the ultimate cause of death. The patient must be the one 
who pulls the proverbial trigger in the case of assisted 
suicide.  
  This requirement of patient intention is often touted as a 
difficult to manage liability of assisted suicide. The argument 
is that such a practice would risk opening the door further to 
treatments like active euthanasia.  The real practical risk, 
separate from the anxiety that comes out of fear of a slippery 
slope, concerns how the consent of the patient can not only be 
collected, but proven. This is a difficulty in any litigious 
interaction, and the importance here is amplified by the fact 
that in these cases, the patient would not be alive to confirm 
his intention. This problem, however, is not a shortcoming that 
is absent from other medical treatments. In fact, it would seem 
that at least with an act like assisted suicide, patients would 
have more surety about the way in which their wishes were to be 
enacted, as they are the ones taking the final steps. Contrasted 
to other treatment complications, such as the intention of a 
patient’s DNR, assisted suicide may actually be a more foolproof 
system. For example, a patient in cardiac arrest cannot confirm 
to her caretakers that it was an arrest just like this one for 
which her orders were intended. There are plenty of cases where 
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DNR orders fall into confusing traps. Christopher Meyers, in his 
A Practical Guide to Clinical Ethics Consulting, presents just 
such a case, though it is not intended for this purpose.11 In 
Meyers’s story, a patient, who previously had been diagnosed 
with HIV/AIDS has come into a doctor’s office. The patient is 
aware of his impending fate and has drawn up documents detailing 
his wish not to be resuscitated or be kept alive by 
extraordinary means when his disease finally takes his life. 
During a routine treatment, however, the patient goes into 
anaphylaxis after having a reaction to an antibiotic. The result 
is that the patient required treatments that he had asked not to 
receive in order to save his life from a threat that had little 
to do with the sickness that prompted him to draw up his 
advanced care directive. This is just one of the many practical 
issues that arise with advanced directives, but it illustrates a 
point: that error in intent of execution is a much larger issue 
when the patient cannot make his intentions clear. Assisted 
suicide avoids this because it is the patient who must actually 
commit the life taking act.  
 It may seem strange to come down in favor of assisted 
suicide, yet be unsure about euthanasia of incapacitated 
patients, as those whose diseases have progressed to such an 
extreme stage may seem to be in even greater need of 
                                                
11 Christopher Meyers, A Practical Guide to Clinical Ethics Consulting. (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. 
2007) 68. 
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compassionate care. While this may be the case, and while our 
arguments here may help to sway one toward a position that is 
more accepting of euthanasia of incapacitated patients, this 
will not be the focus of our inquiry. There, however, are other 
states which patients may find themselves in that will be 
important to our discussion, beginning with what has been called 
brain death.  
 With the advent of new cardiac and respiratory technologies 
in the mid-1900s, patients’ bodies could be kept functioning 
with the help of machines, even after their brains were unable 
to support these systems on their own.12  This development left a 
gap in care standards because previously, the separate brain-
heart-lung systems could not operate independently of one 
another. While only one needed to fail to cause death, due to 
strokes or heart attacks, all systems quickly failed in unison, 
due to their interconnectedness. These new technologies meant 
that patients could be kept alive indefinitely, and this posed a 
real problem for the medical community. Although it was true 
that simply removing the support would be enough to cause the 
death of the patient, the medical tradition had been built up 
around the ‘do no harm’ ideology in which everything possible 
was done to keep patients alive (so long as the resources were 
there). The solution to this problem came from an ad hoc 
                                                
12 Martin Benjamin, “Pragmatism and the Determination of Death.” From Pragmatic Bioethics, ed. Glenn 
McGee. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003) 193 
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committee at the Harvard Medical School that defined a new sort 
of death—brain death13. The truth was, however, that the end 
result, the state of death, was the same for patients who 
suffered brain death as it was for those who suffered from a 
‘traditional’ death. Nevertheless, the idea of brain death took 
off and became a real concern for patients and patient groups, 
as it seemed there was some new type of death to which people 
were susceptible. The truth was that definition had been given 
to what was before a sloppy term. This new definition came 
alongside a new perspective on how we are to define not only 
death, but also life.   
 Brain death was centered on the idea that so long as there 
was not a certain amount of activity in particular parts of the 
brain, the patient could not be expected either to survive on 
her own, or to regain the ability to do so. The limits were 
technically defined, and the tests were laid out with care. The 
decision on brain death did not have to be made quickly; the 
body was being kept alive in some way, and the tests could be 
administered to ensure the fate of the patient was certain. But 
the guidelines for brain death brought to issue another 
question: At what level must we have brain function to ensure 
life? Two different standards exist medically, however, as we 
                                                
13 Ibid., 194.  
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will see, for the patient there is practically little difference 
between these states.  
 Micah Hester lumps these two states together as 
‘Permanently Incapacitated,’ though much can be realized by 
noting the differences between them. The first, whole brain 
death, is exactly the case that it sounds like; higher functions 
and lower functions are lost, meaning that, “neither conscious 
activity nor reflexive motor response occurs.”14 It was cases 
like this that the Harvard Committee on brain death had in mind 
when it laid out its criteria. But in testing for total brain 
death, another, more difficult type of patient was discovered— 
those in a permanent or persistent vegetative state (PVS). 
Patients in a PVS lack higher brain function, meaning that those 
patients are incapable of “awareness and consciousness.15” PVS 
patients do have functioning brain stems. The stem “controls 
vegetative functions, such as respiration, and primitive 
stereotyped reflexes, such as the pupillary response to light.”16 
These patients, when removed from respiratory devices, can 
continue to live on their own but still require feeding tubes 
and fluids. The difficulty of these cases is, of course, that 
while patients in this state still respond to some stimuli and 
are often able to survive on their own for surprisingly long 
                                                
14 D. Micah Hester “Progressive Acts of Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide” Journal of Medical Humanities. 
Vol. 19 No. 4, 1998   
15 Ibid., 285.  
16 Ibid., 285.  
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periods of time, they are totally unconscious beings.  I do 
agree with Hester that a patient in a PVS, “is no longer a 
being, however, which embodies experienceable and expressible 
emotions, values, interests, ideals, and virtues.”17 Because of 
this agreement I also feel comfortable agreeing with Hester, who 
concurs with H. Tristram Engelhardt that “it will not be 
possible generally to justify holding higher-brain-centers-dead-
but-otherwise-alive human bodies to be persons. They are not 
persons. If one kills such an entity, one does not take the life 
of a person.”18 While this is a controversial perspective, it 
certainly can be seen as an increasingly practical view because 
when PVS is accurately diagnosed, it appears to be irreversible. 
 By defining PVS as similar to whole brain death, we are 
better able to understand the alternatives that are currently 
used in place of assisted suicide for patients with terminal 
diseases.  Since current protocols forbid assisted suicide and 
euthanasia, the only acceptable end-of-life care is palliative 
pain management. This is accomplished in a variety of ways, 
depending on the state of the patient and his pain level. In its 
simplest form, palliative pain management can be oral pain 
medication in a home hospice scenario. But because options such 
as assisted suicide and euthanasia are not permissible, there 
exist some rather extreme treatments designed to deal with 
                                                
17 Ibid., 286.  
18 Ibid., 286. Quoting Tristram Engelhardt from Euthanasia and the Newborn. 
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patients  whose deaths come both slowly and painfully. Many of 
these treatments have sharp mental effects due to their use of 
potent pain killers, which can also make it difficult for 
patients to stay awake or move on their own.  
 
Part II 
 Among the most severe of treatments is continual deep 
sedation (CDS). CDS is used for patients who are in such 
excessive pain that all other methods of relief have failed to 
offer substantive results. CDS is an extreme form of the normal 
practice of sedation. Often, patients are sedated during 
difficult treatments so that they can be free of pain and so 
that their body does not react adversely to any treatments. CDS, 
however, is not part of regular pain treatment, but rather is 
one very far end of the scale. It differs from other sorts of 
sedation because it is not focused on protecting the body from 
overreaction to treatment, but rather is used to free a patient 
from pain until death. CDS is an end-of-life treatment that 
effectively kills the consciousness of an individual while 
maintaining the biological organism.  
 Ideally, CDS would not hasten the dying process; it would 
merely render the patient unconscious until death. In 2008, the 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical 
Association released a report titled “Sedation to 
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Unconsciousness in End-of-Life Care.”19 In the report, the AMA 
details the ongoing discussion about deep sedation, addressing 
the legal and ethical ramifications. What is so particular about 
this report and others which come down in favor of CDS is that 
they draw a strong distinction between CDS and euthanasia (and 
assisted suicide) that is inexplicably tied to the idea of a 
natural death.  This notion of death relies too extensively on 
the western idea of dying a natural death. Dying ‘naturally’ is 
a rather poor term for the uses we apply it to, as all causes of 
death can be explained naturally. A bullet in the body alone 
does not cause death; it is the tear in the aorta, the loss of 
blood, and the lack of oxygen transport that does in a gunshot 
victim. On the other hand, a heart attack is the result of the 
natural build up of plaque in the arteries of the heart, but 
this build up may be accelerated by human behaviors such as 
dietary preferences or factors that cause heightened blood 
pressure. The causes of death are in many ways equally natural 
and unnatural.  
 Furthermore, it would seem that undue reverence has been 
given to this idea of natural death, as modern medicine is 
designed to prevent death, no matter how natural the cause may 
be. Emergency rooms are not only filled with assault victims, 
but also with patients who have suffered from strokes or heart 
                                                
19 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association. “Report: Sedation to 
Unconsciousness in End-of-Life Care.” CEJA Report 5-A-08. 2008.   
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failure. Ultimately, putting so much weight on death that comes 
as natural fate seems a rather antiquated notion, given that, at 
least proximally, all death can be understood in terms of a 
natural cause. This is not to say that murder is acceptable 
because the act of killing interrupts normal biological 
processes akin to the way more ‘natural’ deaths also end lives. 
It would be more appropriate to say that there seems to be a 
false dichotomy here between natural and unnatural deaths, 
especially when it comes to the actual actions that lead to a 
loss of a life. Patients who choose to go into CDS and wait to 
die unconsciously are not suffering any more natural a death 
than those who are allowed to commit assisted suicide. In fact, 
both are choosing the point at which they lose consciousness 
(that part which may define human life). The difference is that 
for the CDS patient, the organism that supported her body 
continues to live for an unsettled amount of time.   
 Susan Wolf, noted pragmatist and legal scholar, takes up 
the issue of this difference between assisted suicide and other 
end-of-life treatments in her article “Pragmatism in the Face of 
Death: The Role of Facts in the Assisted Suicide debate.” Wolf 
is want to suggest that there is actually a greater difference 
between assisted suicide and the other well-known end-of-life 
treatments. Wolf is largely correct in her essay to point out 
the lack of surety in predicting outcomes of patients; end-of-
20 
life estimations are purely that--estimations. Wolf also 
recognizes the difficulty inherent in the use of advanced 
directives; the author acknowledges not only that they often are 
not held by many patients, but also that many patients may write 
that they “want physicians to make treatment decisions for 
them.”20 Even when such demands are not written explicitly into 
an advanced directive, patients will still rely upon physicians 
to decide when certain parts of the directive are to be 
triggered. No matter what, patients are left relying upon the 
imperfect expertise of their physicians.  
 While I agree with Wolf on these introductory points, I do 
not feel that these issues will prove as damning to the argument 
for assisted suicide as she desires. The track of her argument  
severely diverges from mine in a few ways, with the largest 
deviation being her assertion that there are a great number of 
ways to alter a patient’s pain load without resorting to 
assisting with suicide. While it may be true that there are a 
multitude of differing pain solutions available to skilled 
clinicians, this does not mean that all of these choices will 
leave the patient fully cognizant or in a state that she prefers 
to the pain she may have been in. Strong pain relievers, even 
without separate sedative treatments, typically cause strong 
reactions in patients, leaving them feeling tired, easily 
                                                
20 Susan Wolf. “Pragmatism in the Face of Death: The Role of Facts in the Assisted Suicide Debate.” 
Minnesota Law Review, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 1063. 1988. *1076.  
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fatigued, and hazy. This also ignores the fact that a pain-
treatment program is not just a single pain reliever, but is 
instead a cocktail including anti-nausea drugs, sedatives, and 
other relaxers. While legal arguments seem to have failed to 
note the similarities between strong pain treatments and 
assisted suicide, these ideas should remain alive in the moral 
realm. Wolf claims that even “sedation to unconsciousness” can 
be used to “relieve terrible pain without causing death.”21 But 
such a claim ignores the different applications of sedation in 
pain relief. CDS is not used without the intent of death; it 
relies on a fallacy that there is something acceptable about 
destroying the conscious portion of an individual while 
protecting the vegetative body.  A study in the Netherlands 
stated that 94% of patients who received CDS passed away within 
a week of being sedated, with none exiting the treatment in that 
period.22 Wolf is correct to point out the availability of 
alternative treatments, but she fails to define why these are 
preferable to assisted suicide, especially in those cases in 
which patients are being sedated with the intention of death. In 
those cases, it would seem that assisted suicide may, in fact, 
have more in common with these treatments than she is willing to 
admit.  
                                                
21 Ibid., *1080.  
22 Judith Rietjens, et. al. “Continuous Deep Sedation for Patients Nearing Death in the Netherlands: 
Descriptive Study.” British Medical Journal, Published online March 14 2008. Last accessed on may 26th, 
2011 at:  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2292332/ 
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 Wolf wants to make sure to avoid the dichotomy of 
“intolerable agony and death” because she feels that these have 
been unfairly drawn as the only two options. The problem is that 
framing them merely as pain and death is not specific enough to 
the cases in which assisted suicide would most likely be used. 
The choices really are intolerable agony and death or death 
alone. The end of these treatments will be death, no matter if a 
patient is treated with CDS or assisted suicide. Wolf is right 
to assert that “a patient who is unconscious will not experience 
anything as degrading and undignified”23, but the truth of this 
assessment dives deeper into the conflict at hand. We are not 
merely dealing with the treating of pain; we are dealing with 
the ending of a life. Neither the patient put into CDS until 
death nor the patient who is assisted in suicide will continue 
to experience anything as degrading or undignified, but this is 
merely because he will fail to experience anything at all. 
Patients who elect to enter CDS are choosing to lose the 
conscious nature that we identify with human life. Patients who 
choose assisted suicide are making the same choice, but they are 
also adding the loss of the biological life as well. That 
biological death (as opposed to the death of the conscious 
person, as mentioned above in the comment from Engelhardt) is 
held out for fate, rather than the individual, to take, seems to 
                                                
23 Wolf, *1080. 
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be a vestigial feature of a morality that all patients may no 
longer identify with.  
 Wolf also stresses a sort of either/or that seems strange, 
given her insistence on avoiding similar errors of thinking. 
Often, she addresses whether or not a patient in a particular 
state would be in the position to make the choice of assisted 
suicide, in the sense that he would be acting from a normalized 
position. That is, she talks about a “depressed and dependent 
patient with inadequately treated symptoms.”24 As has been echoed 
before, many times, in the discussion of end-of-life care, it 
should not be unexpected to have patients near death 
demonstrating signs similar to depression. In a study from The 
Journal of the American Medical Association that addressed the 
preferences and feelings of patients with advanced chronic 
illnesses, researchers found that less than a third of patients 
reported being “Not at all depressed.”25 More than half of the 
subjects called themselves “slightly” or “moderately” depressed, 
and about 10% were “quite” or “extremely” depressed. It is not 
surprising that patients, particularly non spiritual ones26, 
would feel something like what would otherwise be called 
depression when death is looming. Attaching a normalized emotion 
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to this time in a patient’s life is damaging, and it fails to 
recognize the different ways that different individuals deal 
with death. Furthermore, it also fails to fairly account for the 
way in which the period at the end of life is inherently unique. 
To expect these patients to demonstrate the same desire for 
living as young healthy men and women ignores the precarious 
nature of their state.   
 It should also be emphasized, in order to address the 
concerns of Wolf and those who share her opinion, that assisted 
suicide would not be the only treatment offered to patients. We 
do not want this to become a discussion of limiting the use of 
resources on those about to die. Rather, a patient may be kept 
comfortable, to the maximum extent that this is possible, until 
he makes his own choice about the end of his life. The real 
difficulty, as Wolf mentions, is that often patients are in a 
state of pain that seems to be incurable. While Wolf wants us to 
avoid drawing lines here, it seems that we must in the case of 
this pain that she speaks of. If it is possible for a patient’s 
pain to be managed to the extent that she feels comfortable, it 
would seem that at this point, she would be in a fair position 
to make a determination about whether she would like to continue 
her life. Wolf fears that patients may chose death because their 
physician has been unable to relieve their pain. Pain relief, to 
the extent that it can be accomplished, should remain a primary 
25 
goal in patient care. If, however, this pain cannot be managed 
in any appreciable way, meaning that we cannot get the patient 
into a position to make a decision uninfluenced by pain about 
how to continue her treatment, then it seems that Wolf has 
failed to account for such a case. That is to say, in all cases 
where pain can be managed while maintaining a comfortably-
conscious patient, we would think that this patient would be in 
some shape to make determinations about her own life. 
Contrarily, if a patient’s physician is unable to alleviate the 
pain, despite following his best intentions and practices, then 
it would seem that Wolf’s critique is dubious at best.  
 Wolf makes several remarks alluding to the higher instance 
of involuntary assisted suicide in the Netherlands, but I would 
disagree with her assumption that the mere permission of 
assisted suicide is the cause of this. That is, Wolf states that 
the “Dutch rule firmly requires voluntary patient consent for 
assisted suicide and euthanasia.”27 Nevertheless, she worries 
that there are cases in which patients are being subjected to 
this treatment without their consent. While it does seem that in 
allowing for doctors, in the correct circumstances, to 
administer life-ending drugs, these laws may be meeting an 
injustice half way, it does not suggest that an increase in 
misused authority will follow. Doctors who want to act counter 
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to the intentions of their patients or to make false statements 
about the intentions of their patients are equally able to do so 
in a country where assisted suicide is illegal. Doctors 
routinely have access to medication that could kill patients. In 
fact, even in terms of the alternatives that we have discussed 
so far, assisted suicide would remain, in this respect, a safer 
alternative. CDS, like assisted suicide, requires the consent of 
the patient. But unlike in assisted suicide, in CDS, it is the 
doctor who actually commits the act that renders the patient 
unconscious. CDS would then be a more dangerous protocol to 
allow, because the presence of those medications in the patient 
is already caused by the hands of the physician. Furthermore, 
CDS and other protocols are routinely practiced on those 
patients who are incapacitated to the point where they are 
unable to consent to such treatment.  Simply warning that some 
formulations of law have failed to “[deal] seriously with the 
predictable gap between written rules and human behavior”28 is a 
shallow concern, as such claims are applicable to nearly all 
laws.  
 Wolf takes issue with the equivocation of assisted suicide 
and termination of care, arguing that termination of care does 
not have complete control over the timing of one’s death, while 
assisted suicide does. This argument works for Wolf because 
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despite her claims, she is looking for sweeping applications of 
rules. In fact, it seems at times as if she thinks that 
proponents of assisted suicide want the practice to wholly 
replace other sorts of treatment. Her discussion of these points 
begins with a claim that falls in line with my own argument: 
“that physicians’ intent in both terminating treatment and 
assisting suicide is to bring about death.”29 Wolf claims that 
there is no data to back this claim up, but it seems that there 
does not have to be data to support the idea that every time 
physicians remove care, they intend the patient to die. This is 
not to say that their intentions are in any way nefarious, but 
since it is the physicians who commit these acts, it is 
important to ascertain what their intentions may be. While their 
hypothesis (and belief) will be that the patient will die, that 
it is also their intent is not a claim that I think is extreme. 
If it were, we must ask if their intention was for the patient 
not to die. Since it clearly is not, I do not think that it is a 
leap to say that doctors intend (act so as to bring about the 
end) for their patient to die. This point that Wolf brings up 
also seems to fail to realize the lack of a pragmatic difference 
between intending to follow a patent's desire to die and 
intending for death to occur.  
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 The mere fact that this discussion centers around the 
discussion of removing care and end-of-life treatments is 
indicative enough of the fact that some (if not many) doctors 
intend that their patients die when treatment is withdrawn. 
Furthermore, it would seem that all that would really need to be 
proven is that some doctors have death in mind when they 
discontinue care for their patients. Her assertion that 
“physicians remove life-sustaining treatment to honor patients’ 
wishes and their right to be free of unwanted treatment”30 seems 
to ignore the reasons why a patient would desire to be free of 
unwanted treatment. Wolf fails to discuss the extent to which 
patients make decisions based on avoiding death as opposed to 
maximizing health. 
 Wolf’s discussion of pain-relieving treatments also seems 
to miss the mark when it comes to the role that strong 
medications play in end-of-life care. She is right to question 
the assumption that high doses of pain relievers will hasten 
death, as there are plenty of cases where they have failed to do 
so. But what we must ask is whether or not there is a real 
difference between using these medications to relieve pain or to 
cause death. When administered in high-enough doses, pain 
killers have been known to cause death. That a doctor could 
feign ignorance about this ‘side effect’ is not something that 
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should be a tenable position for the pragmatist. Doctors know 
that pain killers not only relieve pain, but also reduce the 
functionality of the patient’s nervous system. To say that 
doctors do not mean to cause these ‘side effects’ (which are 
just as much ‘effects’ as pain relief) fails our pragmatic test 
established by James. The practical difference of intending it 
or not is the same; the patient will often be compromised by her 
medication, and the physician knows that this will be the 
outcome. 
 Whether or not some doctors have been illegally using 
medications to kill their patients is not what should dictate 
the acceptability of a controlled, assisted-suicide practice. As 
for sedation until death, there are plenty of cases in which CDS 
has been used not only with the intention of the patient dying 
while unconscious, but also with the intention that CDS hasten 
death. In addition, the AMA as well as the U.S. Supreme Court 
has said that such practice is permissible.31   
 Wolf’s argument, though claiming to be pragmatic, puts up 
barriers between treatments like CDS and assisted suicide that 
when examined seem to disappear. Furthermore, her brand of 
pragmatism, as presented in this essay, is overly focused on 
empiricism in a way that fails to capture the essence of this 
debate. While we are obliged to pursue all available data, there 
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may not be a real source that would allow us to approximate a 
preferable last action, as so much is similar between two of the 
choices. In essence, we must ask whether CDS, where the 
intention is sedation until death, is really that different from 
assisted suicide. While CDS protocols would require the body to 
continue to receive nutrition (although not all do), there is a 
strong weight we must attribute to the intention of the 
practice. Furthermore, Wolf’s desire for data seems quite 
limited. As we have seen, there may not be data that 
demonstrates a difference in the experience of an individual who 
undergoes CDS as opposed to assisted suicide, because the 
experience to them may be very similar. Where data will be 
important, as I discuss later, is in determining if the meanings 
of the different end-of-life choices matter to the patients 
choosing them. In that case, we may have a moral obligation to 
permit the patients to act according to their desires.  
 The great difficulty of comparing CDS to assisted suicide 
is the often-made deceptive claim that CDS is not permanent in 
the same way as assisted suicide. Jeroen Hasselaar, in his 
“Palliative Sedation Until Death: an Approach From Kant’s Ethics 
of Virtue” demonstrates this mistake:  
To be clear, the argument is not that all sedated 
patients have rational capacities, but that the 
intentional lowering of consciousness until death does 
not in itself destroy those rational capacities of the 
patient. In contrast, (assisted) suicide involves the 
immediate and total destruction of all predispositions 
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of agency. CDS as the intentional reduction of the 
expression of free action does not necessarily involve 
the intentional destruction of capacities for free 
action.32  
 
While this quote comes from a Kantian analysis of a subject 
similar to my own, it nonetheless demonstrates the same sort of 
errors that permeate much of the discussion of the differences 
between CDS and assisted suicide. As mentioned before, in 94% of 
Dutch cases, the patient passed on within a week of being 
sedated. Patients who have reached the point where CDS is the 
only viable option are not in the position to rapidly recover 
while unconscious. Rather, the intention is purely to put 
patients into this state and wait for death to take them on its 
own time. Burying someone alive may not kill them instantly, but 
if you never plan on digging them out, it’s the same as killing 
them. CDS buries the rational personhood of the individual and 
waits for death to take the body. I realize that this is a 
strong formulation of what occurs in CDS, but given the data on 
the use of CDS coupled with the reality of CDS’s complete 
(albeit ‘potentially’ temporary) destruction of agency, I feel 
it to be an accurate comparison.  
 The greatest error with Wolf’s perspective, and like it the 
perspectives of similarly minded pragmatists, is that it fails 
to recognize the limited extent of the demands that assisted 
suicide places on others relative to the effect that the 
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treatment has on the patient. To best maximize the fulfillment 
of the desires of all parties involved, one would have to 
recognize that choosing when and where one dies, when death is 
eminent, will have a much greater effect for the dying 
individual than it may have on the other stake-holding parties. 
Wolf, I imagine, would want to see data to reinforce this, and 
there seems to be enough to help our case. From the earlier 
mentioned JAMA article comes the following data: in the survey, 
39% of patients agreed that it was important to know the timing 
of one’s death, and 40% agreed that it was important to control 
the time and place of one’s death.33 On the other hand, family 
members agreed 49% with the importance of timing, yet only 38% 
with the time and place. 40% of Family members neither agreed 
nor disagreed with the place/time question. The disagreement 
here is interesting if only for the flop between the two groups 
when it comes to the difference between timing and controlling 
the time and place. More critical to our discussion, however, is 
the fact that 78% of family members either agreed or felt 
neutral about importance of the patient choosing the time and 
place of his death. If almost 4 out of 5 people do not take an 
issue with the patient choosing these parameters of his death, 
it seems silly not to oblige such desires when he has them. In 
fact, given our Jamesian attempt to maximize goods, it would be 
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wrong of us to protest when it would be a net (and easily 
accomplished) gain.  
 In our attempt to do the most good, we must acknowledge 
that for some patients, taking control of their death by taking 
their own lives may be a greater good than the damage it does to 
other individuals. By limiting a patient’s choice to treatments 
such as CDS, we are refusing to oblige a dying individual with 
what, for him, may be the greatest possible good at that time. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of CDS and the realization of its 
similarity in practice to assisted suicide should demonstrate 
that the gap between these acts is much smaller than Wolf and 
Hasselaar admit. The central difference remains who (or what) it 
is that does the final act of killing the patient.  
 Realizing that CDS, a currently allowed practice, is very 
much like assisted suicide is not enough to argue for the moral 
permissibility of assisted suicide. Rather, so far what we have 
done is examine the lack of true mechanical difference between 
CDS and assisted suicide. If we accept that CDS is a morally 
correct practice, then we must also admit that assisted suicide 
is one as well. However, the realization of this similarity may 
cause one to reexamine the permissibility of them both. In part 
III, I will continue to discuss the similarity of CDS and 
assisted suicide as therapies, but I will also address the moral 
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benefits that are achieved when patients are allowed to be 
assisted in taking their own lives.  
 
Part III 
 Mary B. Mahowald formulates the central discussion of the 
acceptability of assisted suicide as such: how can a doctor 
balance the obligations that he has to a patient to both 
minimize pain, while also avoiding death? The problem with 
making this question a sort of dichotomy is that these 
considerations do not operate on common scales. That is to say, 
death is a binary consideration. One either is or is not dead, 
while pain operates on a scale. Pain can be of differing types 
and of differing strengths; it can affect different people in 
different ways. Death, contrarily, does not work in such a way. 
It is wholly a similar enterprise for all people; it is 
inescapable and necessary. Trying, then, to balance these two 
obligations will be futile. On the great scale of determination, 
pain can be added in the smallest of increments, while death 
will overwhelm the balance. This combination of binary and 
scaled concerns is just one of the many factors that make end-
of-life care a particularly individual concern.  
 Medical treatment in general is becoming increasingly 
centralized, and as this occurs, it has been argued that doctors 
are less in touch with the needs of their individual patients. 
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In some cases, this development is an inevitable product of 
increased medical knowledge. In a world where the totality of 
practical medical procedures could fit into a doctor’s bag, 
these concerns were minimized; the average patient needed to see 
only one doctor. Advancements in medical technology and 
instrumentation, however, have led to a massive shift in the 
capabilities of the individual physician.  Many doctors are 
forced to become ultra-specialists purely because of the massive 
amount of information they must know to be considered experts. 
American doctors face between 3 and 10 years of graduate medical 
education (in excess of their 4 years of medical school), during 
which they increasingly focus on highly specific ailments. And 
once in practice, it is not unheard of for physicians to focus 
on treating one specific disease or ailment. In light of these 
developments, it is not surprising that medicine has taken the 
institutional turn that it has, regardless of the economic 
pressures that have also taken root. While this development is 
often seen as alienating, I believe that it can also be viewed 
as a great advancement in favor of individualized care.  
 While it is true that patients no longer see the same 
doctor for all of their ailments, increased specialization 
signals the recognition of the differentiation of disease. That 
is to say, specialized medical education is necessary to help 
physicians identify the possible causes and complications of an 
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individual patient’s concerns. This means that physicians are 
better prepared to realize the differences between cases than 
ever before. By realizing this individuality, the debate over 
end-of-life treatment can begin to take on an entirely more 
substantive focus.  
 Returning to the terms discussed above, allow me to analyze 
the differences between palliative care and assisted patient 
suicide. But first, what are the practical differences between 
suicide, assisted suicide, and patient-voluntary euthanasia? 
Suicide is an act that most people are familiar with in many 
forms. Performed by an individual, it can be thought of as not 
involving the assistance of any other person (in so far as the 
person who provided the tool by which the act is committed was 
unaware of its eventual use in a suicide). It should not be 
difficult to absolve the rope maker of guilt in a hanging, or 
McNeil in the case of a Tylenol overdose. In the next two cases, 
it can be more difficult to discern culpability, but they are 
important for our discussion. The distinction between assisting 
in suicide and what may be called voluntary euthanasia relies on 
who actually commits the final act. It is this distinction that 
famously put Dr. Jack Kevorkian behind bars for his mercy 
killings.34 Kevorkian had, by his own admission, helped more than 
130 patients kill themselves. It was while treating a patient 
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with ALS (Lou Gehrig’s disease) that he crossed a different 
barrier. That barrier was committing the final act on his own—
injecting the patient with the final substances that killed him.  
 The reason that the discussion of these three differing 
acts is so frustrating is because, at least on the surface, it 
seems that a perfectly well person is free to end her life as 
she pleases. The inverse relationship of her medical status is a 
puzzling difficulty to this discussion precisely because it 
would seem that suicide may be a useful respite from pain for 
those patients who are most unable to commit the act on their 
own. In this way, assisting a hospitalized patient with suicide 
is merely giving them back a power that she had when she was 
healthy and not under medical supervision.  
 Micah Hester brings out another issue of illness at the end 
of life that is particularly daunting: the issue of 
“everydayness.”35 It is true that even a regular illness is “a 
break in/with our everyday activities.”36  Such a definition does 
stress medicine’s increased focus on the normal day-to-day life 
of the patient, but it also brings up a problem that is unique 
to end-of-life care and in particular, assisted suicide. This is 
the single mark of difference from a habit that permeates every 
day of a person’s life— staying alive. Handling habits in the 
pragmatic sense is an important duty, as we can shape our moral 
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personality by forming and reinforcing those beneficial habits. 
The problem with giving in to dying, at least on the surface, is 
that this seems to be against the largest of habits. That is, in 
the simplest form, a habit of realizing one’s mortality and 
choosing to end it in a specific way is not a habit at all; it 
is used only once. This approximation, however, may be 
misguided. Choices made at the end of one’s life may be affected 
by the uniqueness of dying, but these decisions may be dealt 
with in line with the other habits a person has cultivated 
through her life. In this case, we can argue that a person who 
chooses assisted suicide may be acting in line with a lifelong 
habit of taking control of her fate.  
 We should, given the importance of this habituation, allow 
those people who have lived a life in line with such ideals to 
end their life in a similar way, so long as no immoral baggage 
comes attached to their obligations. Hester does not formulate 
this view in the aforementioned essay, but the author does go on 
to discuss it in a later piece titled “Significance at the End 
of Life.”37 Hester’s summation of this later article is as such:  
Lacking any a priori reasons against aiding the 
dying and given James’s take on ‘meaning’ as the 
intelligent development and pursuit of individual 
ideas communally tested, there are good ethical 
reasons to believe that at least in some, maybe 
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very limited, cases, we should aid dying persons in 
their desire to die on their own terms.38   
 
Hester’s defense of his position in this subsequent essay 
demonstrates the more fundamentally pragmatic nature of his 
claims. If a patient has spent his life acting in line with a 
habit of taking control of his life, and at every test this 
habit has proven to be a beneficial moral perspective, then it 
would seem that we have no right to forbid him from completing 
his life in line with his ideals.   
 Pragmatism avoids a dependence on a presumed a priori 
prediction of ends which gives great power to the specific 
circumstances of a patient’s life. According to Hester, 
“pragmatic, intelligent purpose undermines simple categorical 
logic by transforming experience into something evolutionary.”39 
Data, as Wolf points out, is a critical part of formulating our 
system of beliefs and habits, however, care providers must be 
cognizant of the fact that what has worked for them may not be 
something that has worked for their patients. That is to say, 
patients will enter physicians’ care with a history that has 
come to shape their desires and dispositions. To demand some 
sort of extra-personal empirical data will only do a disservice 
to patients who are in the midst of testing out, through living, 
their own beliefs. Keeping track of all deaths will not tell us 
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about those particularly difficult cases in which assisted 
suicide may be the most compassionate recourse.  
 A great difficulty in talking about the acceptability of 
assisted suicide occurs because as an ethical concept, it exists 
in a world where things are spoken of as good and bad. Certainly 
there are contextual aspects to what is good and bad in many 
ethical systems; hunger can at times be a plus or a minus, but 
the contextual focus of pragmatism gives greater strength to the 
determinations reached. The failing of more absolute systems 
occurs when they make the assumption that a mass rule, or 
imperative, can be applied to ethical questions such as those 
that one encounters in end-of-life care. Pragmatism allows for a 
sort of objectivity in that things can be called goods and bads, 
but these feelings serve as new standpoints for further 
questioning. Hester’s formulation of this system is as follows: 
“There are hungry persons and happy persons. The discontented 
and fulfilled live here and now. These realities, having formed 
from previous inquires, are retrospective ‘givens’ for new 
inquiry.”40  The flow of pragmatic consideration is then 
evolutionary in that the summation of previous determinations 
forms the new moral equation. It is not merely an equation that 
variable life points are plugged into; rather, the equation also 
evolves with the individual. This makes the question of end-of-
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life care a difficult one because of a number of features. The 
first is the ability of any person to approximate their future 
feelings about dying. This long-form pragmatic consideration 
allows the long-suffering patient to change his wishes for end- 
of-life care based on the continued experience he has with his 
disease. It may be that the hypothesis that has guided a 
patient’s life for a long time fails him when he is near death. 
The evolutionary nature of pragmatism is prepared for these 
developments because it realizes the limited knowledge with 
which individuals begin their inquiries. 
 In recognition of the difficulty of dealing with a 
patient’s changing feelings about her fate and treatment over 
the term of a disease, medical ethicists and observers have been 
calling for increased communication with patients. Pragmatism 
not only demands this increased communication, but also gives 
the data gleaned from it real power to affect a patient’s 
treatment. Such advantages have been the focus of clinical 
pragmatism, as detailed in an essay by Joseph Fins, Matthew 
Baccetta, and Frank Miller entitled “Clinical Pragmatism: A 
Method of Moral Problem Solving.”41 Hester details the project: 
“Clinical pragmatism is democratic, experimental, and fallible, 
attempting to make decisions in full recognition of the need to 
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act in the face of uncertainty.”42  Acting in the face of 
uncertainty is exactly what end-of-life decisions are. Choosing 
how one wants to die is about more than the uncertainty of the 
act itself; it also deals with the great concern of what it is 
like not to live. It may be that at the end of a patient’s life, 
he realizes a new set of desires and feelings that overwhelm his 
previous hypothesis about life. In these cases, pragmatism 
demonstrates the fallibility of its construction (and of the 
human intellect) and allows for patients to reformulate their 
ideals in line with changing desires.   
 Hester recognizes the misdirected search for empirical data 
that Wolf has in her “Shifting Paradigms.” For pragmatists, the 
data gathered is only meaningful insofar as it is relevant to 
the concerns of the investigator. That is, Wolf is mistaken to 
demand the presence of some universal data in order to show that 
allowing assisted suicide would be a ‘better’ state. Rather, the 
real focus in our discussion should be set on data at the 
personal level; “Principles must be developed from the features 
and specifics of the problematic situation that we are 
attempting to make satisfactory.”43 The data used in this paper 
can be integrated in a similar way. Studies cited have 
demonstrated the desire for assisted suicide among certain 
patients. That we have a large number of unmet desires that 
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could, with relative ease, be fulfilled demonstrates the need 
for a redesign of our allowed practices. This does not mean that 
assisted suicide will be an option for all patients, but rather 
that our data shows that it will be for some.  
 It is a narrow balance, keeping the idea of consensus in 
mind while investigating, and for Wolf, the desire to look for a 
strong statement is overwhelming. Hester describes Wolf’s legal 
pragmatism as needing “only exhibit certain features such as 
being contextual and instrumental, future-oriented, empirically 
minded, and eclectic.”44  But the issue is more than this; it is 
the lack of balance between these trademark features that makes 
Wolf’s pragmatism so difficult to relate to. Hester admits that 
the movement of what he calls ‘freestanding pragmatism’ 
encounters grave problems because it is too willing “to eschew, 
even denounce, the larger pragmatist context.”45  
 Hester gives us a great lesson from the freestanding 
pragmatists—the reminder that pragmatism does not hang its hat 
on the authority of any person, not even its founders. While it 
is important to see that there is support for assisted suicide 
among some pragmatists, this is merely data in our decision-
making process. We may give fair weight to the opinions of our 
heroes, but we do not depend solely upon them to reach our 
personal determinations. John Arras’s note that “in an important 
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way pragmatism and many of its salient features are already 
constitutive of bioethics as a discipline and practice”46  
demonstrates the great usefulness of pragmatism as a system for 
the clinical environment. The reality of ethics applied in 
practice is that axiomatic systems fail to motivate people 
because there is such difficulty in their wide application. They 
offend and alienate; they judge without accurate context or 
understanding. Pragmatism then becomes the perfect system for 
the clinic because it already reflects the reality and plurality 
of American life.  
 Lisa Bellatoni brings this to light as well, as she 
discusses Miller, Fins, and Bacchetta in her essay “What Good is 
a Pragmatic Bioethic?” Here, she contends that “Debates among 
bioethicists [have] become ever more removed from the clinical, 
cultural and public policy arenas wherein such issues arise.” 47 
Pragmatism as a system is well-insulated from these types of 
concerns because of its very nature as an un-insulated process 
of inquiry. Debates are kept at the bedside, where the context 
of the question can best be kept in mind. Moving the discussion 
away to address it more universally is a violation of the very 
system. In this way, pragmatism also somewhat insulates ethical 
considerations from academic pressures and trade winds.  
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 There are problems that any ethical school will encounter 
in certain aspects of the assisted-suicide debate, such as the 
discussion of assisted suicides committed by psychiatrists. It 
is important to note that we will not have to set assisted-
suicide guidelines widely; in fact, attempts to formulate 
principles for dealing with assisted suicide will only violate 
the specific context of the patient’s concerns. That is to say, 
patients at the end of their lives will demonstrate their 
troubles differently. To say that no patients who have 
previously received psychiatric (or any other particular) 
treatment can be assisted in suicide would set up a system that 
will certainly fail at recognizing the true goods for their 
patients.  
 The other difficult issue that we are forced to address 
when we talk about assisted suicide is that we are operating 
with what is an unknown quantity. Some patients will have ideas 
of what death may be like, such as a worldly heaven or a sort of 
non-existing darkness. That we are not sure what death is like 
does not restrict us from allowing patients to believe that 
death will be better than being alive. Because we fail to know 
exactly what it is like, and because there is no data to gather 
(at least not that we can understand as living beings), 
pragmatism allows us to leave these determinations up to the 
patients. The problem with death is that we are making what 
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sounds like a bold claim: the claim that for some patients, 
death may be a preferred state, compared to being in pain near 
death. The issue, of course, is that we do not have enough data 
to be sure of this in the way we may desire, given the 
importance of getting such a question correct. However, this 
determination is really not unlike others that we make while 
alive. That is to say, the real issue here may be that we have 
come to overinflate our idea of how well we can predict the 
future. Beliefs held while alive, for the pragmatist, are mere 
hypotheses. That what occurs after death is similarly unknown 
should not pose additional difficulties for our discussion.   
 Following Hester on James (from Progressive Dying), “a life 
gains significance through its own intellect and fortitude.”48 
This means that any life is then determined by the individual 
who lives that life and not by an external sense of meaning. 
Arguments against the ability to find meaning in the act of 
assisted suicide seem to be caught up believing that there is 
some chance that the sure fate of a terminally-ill patient can 
be avoided. In many cases, choosing to die while still cogent 
may be the last and only meaningful act left for the patient to 
carry out. The counter to this would be that the choice to live 
on defiantly in the face of impending death could also be 
meaningful, but this will, of course, depend on the preference 
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of the patient. Both continuing to live in the face of sure 
death and bravely choosing death when at risk of losing control 
of one’s life are acceptable end-of-life perspectives. This 
should be recognized fairly, and patients should be allowed to 
make end-of-life decisions that reflect these beliefs.  
 James’s emphasis on desires and their fulfillment gives us 
an entirely practical system of ethical comparison for the 
clinic. Hester asserts that end-of-life decisions such as 
assisted suicide fall well in line with James’s idea of morality 
as a sum of desires, and I tend to agree with him. In the case 
of a patient who would be eligible for assisted suicide, we see 
a confluence of different factors that affect what we would call 
the sum of these desires. An important shift in this process is 
the affirmation of the meaning of talking one’s own life rather 
than suffering toward a painful and debilitating death. Doctors, 
patients, and family members can add to this calculation by 
aligning their desires so as to promote the power of the 
individual who has reached the end of his life.  
 Implicit in the above discussion is the idea that sense of 
life, or at least the life that is most important to this 
debate, is that of the person and not of the mere biological 
organism. In this, I largely agree with Martin Benjamin, who 
says that when it comes to this question of what matters in 
life, “conceiving the subject of life and death in terms of 
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personhood will provide a more satisfactory answer to this 
family of questions than conceiving it in terms of biology 
alone.”49 It is clear that the medical community has yet to make 
up its mind about this question, as can be seen from our 
previous discussion of PVS patients and CDS. PVS patients, 
though survivable organisms, are clearly viewed as a problem 
that needs solving, as they fail to display the traits that we 
treasure in humans. Yet at the same time, CDS is lauded because 
it does not destroy (even if in name only) the future 
possibility of these same human traits. It seems clear that as 
treatments increasingly begin to suppress these capabilities 
that we so treasure in patients who also are near biological 
death, that the patients should have the power to decide that 
they are no longer happy with the treatment they are receiving. 
To borrow again from Benjamin, “what really matters to us, when 
we consider out own lives and the lives of others, is continued 
existence as persons, not continued existence of personless 
organisms.”50 While this may seem in part like a betrayal of our 
animal nature, a simple appeal to that which defines others in 
our minds will prove this assertion correct. I doubt many people 
would prefer a lengthened, but merely vegetative life for their 
best friend over a shorter, yet fully cognizant existence.   
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 The problem at hand, of course, comes back to whom these 
strong formulations affect. While, of course, this serves well 
our argument for assisted suicide, what about the young who 
suffer similar but possibly temporary decisions? Or what about 
the disabled, who are among the largest opponents to assisted-
suicide legislation because they fear that it will eventually be 
used against them? On this topic, I defer to John Lachs, who in 
his “Dying Old as a Social Problem,”51 addresses the reality of 
this problem. I agree with Lachs that those looking to claim to 
stand for the preservation of all life in all of its forms are 
misguided. Furthermore, I agree with his assertion that since 
“we live in a world of relative plenty...economic considerations 
should not be allowed primacy in such decisions.”52 The largest 
factors to examine when it comes to assisted suicide should 
first and foremost be the course of the patient’s affliction and 
the patient’s feelings about its progression. The goal of 
allowing for assisted suicide is to make suicide as real of a 
choice for those who are near death as it is for the healthy who 
are free to take their own lives each day. The difference, of 
course, is that were a young, healthy person to kill himself, 
there is the potential that the meaning would be lost by giving 
in to his nihilist tendencies. As for those who are near death 
already, taking control of their lives with assisted suicide 
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means that they are asserting that life ends with the death of 
the person and not that of the organism. It is a choice not to 
be reduced to an organism like mere broccoli, a choice that we 
otherwise would not treasure had the body not been the previous 
home of our good friend.  
 Currently used alternatives, even in places where 
euthanasia is allowed, are being misused because we have failed 
to de-emphasize the myth of natural death, leading patients’ 
best intentions to be ignored. That is, where a patient may 
prefer an act like assisted suicide, social pressures push him 
to opt for another choice such as CDS. Once unconscious, 
however, the patient is unaware of the treatment he may or may 
not continue to receive. In a study of terminal sedation in the 
Netherlands, researchers found that only 33% of the patients who 
received CDS had requested the treatment.53 Furthermore, only 34% 
of the patients who received CDS discussed with their doctor the 
idea of forgoing artificial nutrition and hydration. This means 
that 2 out of every 3 patients were being put into a state where 
the doctor was unaware of their desires for care. Complicating 
matters further is the fact that in only 36% of cases was CDS 
not used with the intent to hasten death.  
 The desires of patients need to be better understood and 
explored, and the largest barrier to this is the limiting of 
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choices that pose no grave moral threat to society at large. The 
question of active euthanasia is a difficult one, but as we see 
in the Netherlands, just allowing for it does not make it an 
active choice. In the aforementioned study, only 37% of patients 
even discussed the idea of euthanasia with their doctor54. The 
problem here is that our social perspective on end-of-life care 
does not accurately embrace the meaning that death can give to a 
life even in its waning hours. By emphasizing a pragmatic 
approach, we can make sure that the most goods are being done 
for patients who are near death.  
 The best formulation of this final respect also comes from 
Lachs, who affirms that when it comes to terminal patients, 
“Respect for them requires that we permit the last word to be 
theirs.”55 Assisted suicide should never be a treatment that 
finds its way to a physician's prescription pad. What it should 
remain is a choice for care in line with other, similar end-of- 
life treatments. This respect for final decisions must work in 
two directions: the ability to refuse to kill oneself and the 
opportunity to do so. In this, we must support the legal ability 
to end one’s own life, a position fortified by the moral gains 
that are brought by allowing dying patients to express their 
final desires. It may be the case for some patients, “that some 
people at the distant edge of life decide or recognize that it 
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is better not to be.”56 It is our responsibility, recognizing 
their status as moral actors, to allow terminally ill patients 
to continue to express their moral desires — to affirm their 
positions as the persons who we value so greatly.  
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